US Must Come Clean with India: No More Kirana Hills Comedy

By Ranjan Sarkhel | Gondwana Readers |

Former CIA officer John Kiriakou—that the United States “purchased” control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

 Key Point's :

• The U.S. “purchased” control over Pakistan’s nukes—Musharraf happily obliged.
• A.Q. Khan was protected, thanks to Saudi requests.
• America’s foreign policy continues to juggle democracy and dictatorships.
• India deserves transparency—especially when the neighbours can’t tell uranium from unemployment.

When it comes to nuclear secrets, Pakistan’s track record could make even a sieve look airtight.
After the shocking revelations by former CIA officer John Kiriakou—that the United States “purchased” control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by showering millions on then-President Pervez Musharraf—India has every reason to raise an eyebrow and perhaps a formal note to Washington:
“Dear America, if you already have the keys to Pakistan’s nukes, could you please tell us where they are before the next Kirana Hills happens?”
Because let’s be honest—trusting Pakistan with nuclear responsibility is like trusting a toddler with a grenade pin.

The Revelation That Made the Tea Go Cold in South Block

Kiriakou, a veteran CIA whistleblower, dropped the kind of bombshell that Islamabad pretends doesn’t exist:
• The U.S. allegedly controlled Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by funding Musharraf’s military empire.
• Musharraf, in return, played the grand double game—smiling at the Pentagon by day and winking at terror groups by night.
• The Saudis, meanwhile, shielded A.Q. Khan, the “Father of Pakistan’s Nukes,” who apparently had more export options than Amazon.
So, while Washington congratulated itself for “securing” Pakistan’s nukes, the rest of the world watched as Pakistan secured itself a gold medal in self-contradiction.

Operation Sindur, Kirana Hills, and the Art of Not Knowing

The Kirana Hills incident, during India’s Operation Sindur, remains one of those episodes everyone talks about in whispers and footnotes.

Unexplained seismic data, suspicious logistics, and the usual Pakistani denials that are now a national pastime.

Had the U.S. been more transparent with India about its “oversight” of Pakistan’s nukes, perhaps that incident could’ve been avoided—or at least explained without three cups of strong chai and a headache.

Hence the new Indian refrain:
“If America already has Pakistan’s launch codes, it might as well share the Google Maps pin with New Delhi.”

Pakistan’s Nuclear Comedy Club

Let’s pause to appreciate Pakistan’s nuclear consistency—consistently confused, that is.
• Their Prime Ministers change faster than their missiles’ guidance systems.
• Their scientists go missing one year and give exclusive interviews the next.
• Their military speaks of “strategic depth” while sinking in economic shallows.
And yet, Islamabad insists that it’s in “full control” of its arsenal.

One wonders if that arsenal is stored in the same cabinet as their missing IMF payments.

If Musharraf “sold” nuclear control to Washington, then Pakistan’s sovereignty must now be rented by the hour.

America’s Selective Memory: The Art of Buying Friends and Losing Files

John Kiriakou’s interview exposes the heart of American foreign policy theatre—a Broadway production where “democracy” is the tagline and “dictators” are the cast.

He reminds us:
“The U.S. buys oil from dictators and sells them weapons—then writes essays about human rights.”

So while the U.S. “managed” Pakistan’s nukes through aid, it conveniently ignored the terrorism those same generals were exporting eastward.

Apparently, democracy is negotiable, but arms contracts are not.

The Case for Sharing—Intelligence, Not Excuses

India has shown remarkable restraint in public—silence that often hides strategic concern. But this time, the message to Washington should be clear:
“If you’re holding Pakistan’s nuclear leash, we deserve to know how long it is.”

After all, cooperation between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s self-appointed democracy should include transparency, not selective secrecy.

If the U.S. can tell Islamabad what to do with its nukes, it can surely tell New Delhi where they’re parked.

Otherwise, the next Kirana Hills-type “incident” might not be a mystery. It might be a miscommunication—one that nobody can afford.

Saudi Arabia: The Silent Partner in Pakistan’s Nuclear Soap Opera

Kiriakou also pointed fingers at Saudi Arabia, claiming the U.S. dropped its plans against A.Q. Khan because Riyadh asked them to “leave him alone.”
Translation: “We’re working on something shiny too, so please don’t spoil the fun.”

Now that the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact is taking shape, the plot thickens—because when it comes to nuclear secrets, Pakistan has always been the over-eager intern who accidentally forwards the boss’s confidential email to everyone in the office.

Global Chessboard, Local Clowns

With the U.S. becoming energy independent, Saudi Arabia cozying up to China, and Pakistan selling nostalgia about “strategic importance,” one thing is certain:
The world’s power balance is shifting—and Pakistan’s relevance is evaporating faster than its foreign reserves.
China wants minerals, Saudi wants leverage, and the U.S. wants plausible deniability.
Only India wants stability. And perhaps a little honesty.

Final Word: America, It’s Time to Share

Washington cannot play “guardian of global peace” while hiding regional secrets that affect 1.4 billion people next door.
If America truly values its partnership with India, it should:
• Disclose any oversight roles it maintains on Pakistan’s nuclear command.
• Establish a real-time intelligence sharing framework for nuclear risk reduction.
• Prevent another Kirana Hills-like incident—not through luck, but through cooperation.
Because if Pakistan’s nukes are really under U.S. control, the least Washington can do is send Delhi the user manual,

Read Game Changer Schemes

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